What is Epistemic Public Trust in Science? by İrzik, Gürol & Kurtulmus, Faik
  
WHAT IS EPISTEMIC PUBLIC TRUST IN SCIENCE? 
Gürol Irzik and Faik Kurtulmus 
Forthcoming in BJPS 
Abstract 
We provide an analysis of the public’s having warranted epistemic trust in 
science, that is, the conditions under which the public may be said to have 
well-placed trust in the scientists as providers of information. We 
distinguish between basic and enhanced epistemic trust in science and 
provide necessary conditions for both. We then present the controversy 
regarding the (alleged) connection between autism and measles-mumps-
rubella vaccination as a case study to illustrate our analysis. The realization 
of warranted epistemic public trust in science requires various societal 
conditions, which we briefly introduce in the concluding section. 
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1 Introduction 
Epistemic public trust in science is essential for both the individual and the 
common good. We routinely rely on the findings of science for personal and 
public health from the use of antibiotics to the drinking of tap water. We 
abide by the decisions of the criminal courts that involve the science of 
forensics. Moreover, the very existence of much of scientific research 
depends on citizens’ tacit or explicit consent to the public funding of science 
through taxes. None of this would be the case if people were distrustful of 
scientists. However, what is socially desirable in this context is not mere 
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trust, but rather warranted trust, that is, people investing trust in 
trustworthy scientists with good reasons. Nevertheless, what it means for 
the public to have warranted epistemic trust in scientists has not been 
studied sufficiently in the philosophical literature. 
Accordingly, our aim in this article is to provide the conditions necessary for 
the public to invest warranted epistemic trust in scientists as providers of 
information.1 By warranted epistemic trust we mean well-placed epistemic 
trust: trust with good grounds invested in those scientists with the required 
qualities for being trustworthy. Thus, we shall be concerned not with a 
socio-psychological account of why the public actually trusts or distrusts 
scientists, but rather with warranted public trust as a normative notion, 
spelling out success conditions for the trust relationship. We find it useful to 
distinguish between two kinds of trust: basic and enhanced epistemic trust 
in science. We devote sections 2 and 3 to an analysis of the former. Wilholt 
([2013]) presents a penetrating analysis of epistemic trust within science in 
terms of an enhanced kind of epistemic reliance. He argues that if the 
scientific community is to do justice to the epistemic trust invested in them 
from outside of science, it is not enough that scientists observe the 
methodological standards of their trade; they sometimes also need to take 
into account people’s expectations about the distribution of inductive risks – 
an important condition that we utilize in our analysis. We have constructed 
the phrase ‘enhanced epistemic trust in science’ out of Wilholt’s ‘epistemic 
trust as an enhanced kind of epistemic reliance’ and built his requirement 
regarding public’s expectations about the distribution of inductive risks into 
our analysis of it, which we offer in section 4. In section 5 we present the 
controversy regarding the (alleged) connection between autism and the 
measles-mumps-rubella vaccination as a case study to illustrate our analysis 
and argue that enhanced trust may be difficult to achieve when collective 
and individual interests are not aligned. Our discussion reveals that the 
realization of warranted epistemic public trust in science requires various 
societal conditions, which we briefly introduce in the concluding section. 
                                                        
1 Throughout this paper, when we speak of public trust in science, we actually speak of 
public trust in scientists, not the institution of science in general. Furthermore, we are 
presupposing that the public has a certain level of trust in science as a whole as a way of 
obtaining knowledge about the world. 
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2 Basic Epistemic Trust in Science 
Since epistemic trust is a kind of trust, it would be useful to begin with some 
key features of trust in general. Trust is a three-place relationship between 
the truster, the trustee, and the object of trust: A person trusts another with 
something, which can be an action, a state of affairs, or a proposition (Baier 
[1986], Hardin [2002]). In the case of epistemic trust for our purposes in 
this article, the object of trust is a proposition or a set of propositions P. 
Baier characterizes trust as a special kind of reliance: it is reliance on 
another’s good will. Karen Jones adds that ‘trust is an attitude of optimism 
that the good will and competence of another will extend to cover the 
domain of our interaction with her, together with the expectation that the 
trusted will be directly and favourably moved by the thought that we are 
counting on her’ (Jones [1996], p. 19). When I trust my friend with 
something, I rely on her good will and competence and leave it to her 
discretion to look after it. Yet there is no guarantee that she will do so. 
Hence, trust involves risk-taking and makes the truster vulnerable (Baier 
[1986], [1995]). Thus, unlike mere reliance which can only be disappointed, 
trust can be betrayed and give rise to reactive attitudes (Holton [1994], pp. 
66–7).  
We do not just trust anybody with no reason; we invest trust only in those 
whom we think are trustworthy, that is, those whom we believe to have the 
required qualities such as good will, competence, experience, sound 
judgement and so on (Hardwig [1985], [1991], Smolkin [2008]). A number 
of philosophers employ this connection between trust and trustworthiness 
for clarifying the nature of epistemic trust. For example, in his influential 
account of the role of trust in knowledge, John Hardwig ([1985], [1991]) 
maintains that A comes to know that P based on B’s testimony when B 
knows that P and speaks truthfully, and A has good reasons to believe that 
both conditions are fulfilled. Thus, our knowledge based on testimony 
depends greatly on the epistemic and moral character of our sources.  Ben 
Almassi links epistemic trust with trustworthiness as follows: ‘I trust your 
testimony that P to the degree that I regard you as competent in your 
acceptance of P and conscientious in your presentation of testimony that P, 
and so I take your testimony that P as providing evidence of (a contributing 
reason to believe) P’ (Almassi [2012], p. 43). On the other hand, McCraw 
proposes the following account of epistemic trust: A person H places 
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epistemic trust in another person S that P if and only if ‘(1) H believes that 
P, (2) H takes S to communicate that P, (3) H depends upon S’s (perceived) 
communication for H’s belief that P, and (4) H sees S as epistemically well-
placed with respect to P’ (McCraw [2015], p. 425), where the phrase 
‘epistemically well-placed’ is used to indicate S’s having epistemic authority 
and competence.2 Hardwig, Almassi and McGraw all draw out the 
distinctive features of epistemic trust that we, for the most part, preserve in 
our account. Epistemic trust is about taking someone’s testimony that P as a 
reason to believe that P on the assumption that she is in a position to know 
whether P and will express her belief truthfully.    
Let M be a member of the public investing warranted trust in scientists (S) 
as providers of information, which is a proposition or a set of propositions 
(P). S can be an individual scientist or a collective body composed of 
scientists who are organized in a way that enables them to jointly assert that 
P. To begin with, for M to trust S as a provider of information that P, P 
must be communicated to M by S. Scientists may directly disseminate P 
themselves, say by appearing on TV, or more commonly by publishing an 
article in a scientific journal. Alternatively, their belief that P may be 
reported indirectly by the media. Either way, scientists have the 
responsibility to state P as accurately and as wholly as possible, and, when 
they directly address the public, to report it in light of the public’s 
informational needs and capacities. If M later finds out that crucial 
information has been suppressed or withheld from her, her trust would be 
betrayed. 
When M trusts S that P, M takes S’s statement that P as a strong but 
defeasible reason to believe that P.3 While M can have other reasons to 
believe that P, S's communication of P must be a distinct reason for M to 
believe that P if we are to speak of a relation of trust between M and S. If M 
believes that P, but S's communication of P is not one of the grounds of M's 
belief, then we cannot speak of M placing epistemic trust in S. Moreover, 
                                                        
2 However, McCraw's first condition is too strong. While the testimony of someone in 
whom we place epistemic trust gives us a reason to believe them, this reason can be 
defeated by other reasons that we have. Suppose you have a condition that a doctor 
diagnoses as lupus, but a second doctor disagrees. Both doctors, let us assume, are 
competent and speak truthfully. In such a case, you may rationally withhold judgement. 
According to McCraw's account, you don't have epistemic trust in either doctor. It is, 
however, more natural to claim that you have epistemic trust in both doctors, and it is the 
fact that their claims contradict each other that leads you to withhold judgement. 
3For purposes of simplicity, we treat belief as an all or nothing matter, setting aside degrees 
of belief. 
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what is a reason for M to believe that P has to be not only that S believes 
that P but also the fact that S communicates that P. Epistemic trust involves 
reliance on the good will of the person trusted and the expectation that they 
will be truthful. When M believes something merely because S believes it, 
this does not entail that M trusts S. Suppose a dictator is afraid of being 
poisoned by his aide. He drinks the water his aide offers him only if his aide 
drinks water from the same source. Even though the dictator believes that 
the water is safe because his aide believes so, this does not mean he trusts 
him. Similarly, when we expect someone to tell the truth only for self-
interested reasons, this does not involve trust. When she misleads us, we 
would feel disappointed but not betrayed. In the case of scientists, the 
requirement of good will for epistemic trust amounts to their commitment 
to the ethical norms of their trade and their sense of obligation to truthfully 
and accurately share significant knowledge with the public.4   
Trust, as we have seen, involves reliance not only on the good will but also 
on the competence of the person trusted. What would this amount to in the 
case of epistemic trust in S? A natural thought is that the information P 
provided by S must be true. This, however, would make warranted public 
trust practically impossible because the information S convey is based on 
their research, and scientific research cannot guarantee truth since it is 
fallible. Yet when conducted well, scientific research does produce 
information that is likely to be true. This suggests the requirement that P be 
produced by S in a reliable way even though P’s being produced reliably 
does not guarantee its truth. More specifically, following Alvin Goldman’s 
reliabilism in epistemology (Goldman [1986]), we will say that a piece of 
scientific research that yields P is reliable if it is carried out according to 
methodological guidelines (i.e., methods, procedures, rules and standards 
communally endorsed and monitored) that make the objective probability of 
P's being true sufficiently high. For if a piece of scientific research is not 
reliable and yet M is convinced of scientists' trustworthiness, say, due to 
empty rhetoric or sheer propaganda, then her trust would not be warranted. 
Moreover, because unreliable research seldom produces truths, its 
applications and policies based on it would tend to fail M’s expectations for 
beneficial output. In short, reliability is essential for warranted public trust. 
Even the requirement of actual reliability may seem too demanding. 
Imagine someone who has misleading evidence suggesting that a particular 
                                                        
4 For a helpful discussion of the relationship between trust and norms of knowledge sharing 
see Grasswick ([2010]).  
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piece of research is reliable even though it isn’t and relies on it. Can this 
person be said to have warranted epistemic trust? On our account the 
answer is ‘no’ since the research in question was unreliable, and we think 
this is as it should be. Warranted epistemic trust is well-placed trust, and 
someone can misplace their trust without being at fault. Yet, it is not 
enough that research producing P should be reliable. M should also have 
good reasons to believe that P is the output of reliable research. In the 
absence of such a constraint, M’s warranted epistemic trust in science 
becomes largely a matter of luck. 
In both of these respects warranted trust is analogous to knowledge on the 
traditional analysis. Just as in order for a belief to count as knowledge it has 
to be both (at least) justified and true, warranted epistemic trust requires 
that it be based on good reasons and that its object be actually trustworthy. 
Pulling these together, we offer the following analysis. M has warranted 
epistemic trust in S as a provider of P only if (1) S believes that P and 
honestly (i.e. truthfully, accurately and wholly) communicates it to M either 
directly or indirectly5, (2) M takes the fact that S believes and has 
communicated that P to be a (strong but defeasible) reason to believe that P, 
(3) P is the output of reliable scientific research carried out by S, and (4) M 
relies on S because she has good reasons to believe that P is the output of 
such research and that S has communicated P honestly. While (1) and (3) 
spell out the necessary conditions for S to be trustworthy, (2) and (4) specify 
the necessary conditions for M to trust S and do so with good reasons. 
Once we have this analysis at our disposal, public epistemic trust can be 
formulated as follows: the relevant public will be said to invest warranted 
epistemic trust in S as a provider of P when a sufficient number of its 
members invest warranted epistemic trust in S as a provider of P.6 Our 
formulation refers to the relevant public, because the boundaries of ‘the 
                                                        
5In the case of a collective body of scientists and the group's belief that P, our account is 
neutral between summative accounts, which maintain that a group has a belief that P only 
if all or most of its members believe that P, and non-summative accounts that reject this 
requirement. For a discussion, see (Gilbert [1987]). 
6This is not the only sense in which the expression ‘public trust in science’ can be 
employed. It may also be used to refer to the trust that public bodies acting on behalf of the 
public have in scientists. For instance, if an institutional body such as the Department of 
Health invests trust in scientists, that may also be referred to as public trust in science. 
Public trust in scientists in that sense may not be reducible to the trust that individuals 
within such bodies have. While we think public trust in scientists in that sense is also 
important, our account is not intended to capture it.  
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public’ are determined contextually and usually left implicit. Often it is 
meant to include all adults living in a certain country, but it can also include 
smaller or larger groups of people. Moreover, the public is not a 
homogenous entity and different groups may have different expectations 
from scientific research (Resnik 2011).  
The four conditions above constitute the necessary requirements for what 
we call ‘public’s warranted basic epistemic trust in S’. As we shall see in 
section 4, it is possible to specify further conditions the satisfaction of which 
will enhance public’s epistemic trust in S. 
It should be obvious from our account that the public’s having warranted 
epistemic trust in S is a matter of degree. This is because, first, the degree of 
trust M ought to have in S that P depends on the reliability of S’s research; 
the more reliable S’s research is, the higher the trust M ought to place in S. 
Second, the stronger reasons M has regarding S’s honesty and the reliability 
of her research, the more warrant she will have for investing a particular 
degree of trust in S. Thus, the degree of trust M places in S is well-placed to 
the extent that it matches the strength of reasons M has for believing S to 
be honest and S’s research to be reliable. 
Warranted epistemic trust in science then distributes different burdens on 
different actors and institutions. For instance, conditions 1 and 3 require 
that scientists produce P reliably and honestly disseminate it through an 
appropriate venue. Since the public’s access to P is typically through the 
media, the media has the important responsibility of disseminating P 
properly. Therefore, it plays a crucial role in bringing about warranted trust. 
Condition 4, on the other hand, places a burden on the public. For even if a 
particular piece of research is reliable, the public rarely has direct first-order 
reasons for believing that this is indeed the case. Can they have any 
justification for thinking that the information scientists have provided them 
with is the output of reliable research and therefore likely to be true? We 
address this question in the next section. 
 
3 Deciding Whom to Trust 
Expertise comes in degrees and is domain specific (Collins and Evans 
[2007]). For this reason, there may be situations and domains in which even 
lay people can claim to have some expertise and have access to first-order 
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reasons for judging reliability.7  However, in many cases they will not be in a 
position to understand or evaluate first-order reasons for deciding whether a 
particular piece of research is reliable. In such cases the public can instead 
judge the scientists themselves in terms of criteria which could function as 
second-order reasons. Here we shall follow the work by Alvin Goldman 
(Goldman [2001]) and especially Elizabeth Anderson (Anderson [2011]), 
who usefully categorizes the criteria in question into four groups: assessing 
expertise, honesty, epistemic responsibility, and the existence of a consensus 
of trustworthy experts. 
Anderson points out that scientists who have a high degree of expertise, 
who are honest and epistemically responsible are more trustworthy than 
those who lack such qualities. Criteria for judging scientific expertise reflect 
the hierarchy of expertise from holding a B.S. degree to holding a PhD. 
degree in the field of inquiry, all the way up to being a scientist whose 
research is widely recognized by other scientists in the field and to being a 
leader in the field, indicated by such factors as being elected to national 
academies and receiving prizes for scientific achievements. The public 
should give more weight to the testimony of those higher in the ladder of 
hierarchy. Criteria for assessing honesty, on the other hand, include the 
absence or presence of conflicts of interest; evidence of previous misconduct 
such as plagiarism, fabricating, distorting or suppressing crucial data; 
misrepresenting the claims of other scientists, and the like. Criteria for 
judging epistemic responsibility include whether the research has been 
published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, whether the researcher 
refuses to share data for no good reason, and whether s/he fails to 
acknowledge or engage with refutations of one’s own claims, etc. Finally, 
the public can decide whether a consensus has been consolidated about a 
certain conclusion by inspecting surveys of the peer-reviewed literature and 
of trustworthy experts, and above all by checking if such bodies as National 
Science Academies around the world have issued any consensus reports.8 
Obviously, none of these criteria are conclusive reasons for trusting or 
distrusting scientists. Rather they are reasons that should figure in lay 
persons’ deliberations in deciding to what degree to trust a scientist. 
                                                        
7 In fact, the failure of scientists to acknowledge the expertise of lay people can undermine 
the relationship of trust. For a discussion see Whyte and Crease ([2010]).   
8See Oreskes ([2007]) and Anderson ([2011]) for helpful examples of how lay people can 
indeed make sound second-order judgements of scientists’ trustworthiness about an issue as 
complex as the anthropogenic global warming.  
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Many of these criteria, in particular the criteria for assessing honesty and 
epistemic responsibility, apply directly to groups of scientists as well. For 
instance, one can assess whether a research collaborative has conflicts of 
interest or whether it engages with criticisms of its work. Moreover, even if 
it is conceded that the beliefs and testimony of a group cannot be reduced to 
the beliefs and testimony of its individual members, as has recently been 
argued by Tollefsen ([2007]) and Wilholt ([2016]), it is still the case that 
the reliability and honesty of individual members have a bearing on the 
trustworthiness of the group's testimony. Thus, considerations of whom to 
trust that operate only at the individual level can help decide whether to 
trust groups. Tollefsen and Wilholt give two reasons for the irreducibility of 
a group's reliability to the testimony of its individual members. First, they 
rightly note that in many cases of group testimony there is a division of 
labour and different individuals are responsible for different parts of the 
statement. This, however, does not entail that the trustworthiness of 
individual members of the group does not impact the reliability of the 
group's testimony. If one part of a joint statement is due to a single member, 
then its reliability is influenced by that person. Second, they point out that 
when individual beliefs are aggregated through certain procedures, the 
reliability of the group's belief may be higher than the reliability of each 
individual's belief as demonstrated in Condorcet's Jury Theorem and the 
performance of prediction markets. This is of course true, but these results 
still are, at least in part, shaped by facts about individuals. If, for instance, 
people do not express their beliefs with honesty or the probability that they 
will have a correct belief regarding a proposition is less than chance, then 
Condorcet's Jury Theorem is not applicable. Accordingly, information about 
the trustworthiness of individual scientists that constitute the group who 
give testimony can inform us about the group's trustworthiness even though 
this information will not be conclusive. 
Finally, we should also note that since the public is not a homogenous 
entity, some groups, unlike others, may have legitimate reasons not to trust 
certain scientists due to their differing social positions and past experiences. 
For instance, in light of the history of the Tuskegee experiments, African 
Americans may be justified in distrusting the medical community and 
therefore in demanding more evidence of the good will and honesty of a 
scientist or the reliability of her research than others who do not share the 
same history (Grasswick [2010], Scheman [2001]).   Our account easily 
captures this. The fact that the doctors who carried out the Tuskegee 
experiments misled their subjects, thereby failing to satisfy condition (1), 
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means that conditions (2) and (4) are much more difficult to satisfy for 
African Americans.   
 
4 Enhanced Epistemic Trust in Science 
In section 2 we offered an analysis of what we have called ‘the public’s 
warranted basic epistemic trust in science’, which included the condition 
that the research that yields P must be reliable in the sense that the objective 
probability of its output being true is sufficiently high. This requirement 
leads to a further condition.9 How high should the probability of P’s being 
true be in order for scientists (S) to decide to accept P and communicate it 
to the public? That decision is typically made on the basis of communally 
endorsed methodological guidelines about the significance level in statistical 
testing, when to discard certain data or decide that all the likely sources of 
‘noise’ have been eliminated, and the like. However, in certain cases in 
which the public welfare is at stake, it may be desirable that the 
methodological guidelines scientists employ for accepting or rejecting P take 
into account inductive risks, that is, P’s consequences in relation to two 
types of error –false positives and false negatives.10 False positives arise when 
one accepts a hypothesis as true even though it is not, and false negatives 
arise when one rejects it as false even though it is not. Suppose now that 
either one has serious consequences for M. If S take their expectations into 
account when making methodological decisions, and moreover if those 
members have reason to believe that S have done so, then they would 
certainly invest further (over and above basic) trust in S. 
Hence, we propose to add two further conditions to our earlier analysis: (5) 
When public welfare is at stake, in making methodological decisions 
regarding the distribution of inductive risks with respect to P, S make those 
decisions in agreement with the M’s assessments of the inductive risks in 
question, and (6) M has reason to believe that Condition 5 is satisfied. Basic 
epistemic trust plus these two conditions yield what we call ‘public’s 
(warranted) enhanced epistemic trust in science’. 
The difference between basic epistemic trust and enhanced epistemic trust 
can be illustrated by the following example. Suppose you have two TA’s 
                                                        
9The discussion in this paragraph and the Condition 5 it yields are indebted to Wilholt 
([2013]). 
10For a useful discussion of inductive risks and their significance in hypothesis acceptance 
and science policy, see Douglas ([2000] and [2009]). 
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whom you trust: you rely on their good will, truthfulness, ethical integrity 
and competence. They proctor exams in two separate classrooms and both 
report to you that they each have caught a student cheating on the exam. 
You are particularly worried about falsely charging a student with cheating. 
You know that the first TA has the same concern, whereas the second TA is 
more concerned with not letting any student get away with cheating. While 
you have basic epistemic trust in both TA’s, you have enhanced epistemic 
trust in the first TA who shares your concern. Their reports will have 
different force in your deliberations and you will be much more inclined to 
take action based on the first TA’s report. Enhanced trust will make an even 
more significant difference in the case of the public’s reliance on scientists, 
where they are not in a position to judge the first-order evidence bearing on 
the claims in question.   
One might object to our distinction between basic and enhanced epistemic 
trust on the grounds that the former is mere epistemic reliance and does not 
deserve to be called ‘epistemic trust’. Consider, for example, Wilholt’s 
account of epistemic trust within science. Wilholt claims that when a 
scientist relies on the results of her fellow scientists on the assumption that 
they were obtained by proper employment of the methodological standards 
of the pertinent relevant community, that is mere epistemic reliance – unless 
it is coupled with the requirement that scientists broadly agree on the value 
judgements regarding the evaluations of inductive risks their methodological 
decisions involve (Wilholt [2013], p. 248). Taking his cue from Wilholt’s 
argument, our objector might similarly claim that Condition 3, even when 
taken in conjunction with Condition 4, does not amount to epistemic trust 
– unless combined with Condition 5, which requires that the public’s and 
scientists’ value judgements about the distribution of inductive risks more or 
less coincide in certain cases. 
There are several reasons why we think that such a conclusion must be 
resisted. First, according to our analysis, M has reason to believe that P 
because S not only believes that P but also has communicated to M that P 
in an honest way. M is thus dependent on the goodwill, truthfulness and 
ethical integrity of S with respect to P. This dependence, it seems to us, 
goes beyond mere epistemic reliance and constitutes a basic form of 
epistemic trust. While science indeed has mechanisms that punish 
dishonesty, they cannot by themselves ensure that scientists always act 
honestly. Thus, our expectation that scientists will be honest is based not on 
the conviction that honesty is what best serves their self-interest but on the 
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conviction that they adhere to the ethical norms of science (Hardwig 
[1991], pp. 702-706).   
Second, in many cases of fundamental research such as theoretical work 
concerning star formation in cosmology and unified field theory in physics, 
false negatives and false positives are highly unlikely to have any impact on 
public welfare, in which case there is no reason to require that scientists 
should take into account people’s expectations about inductive risks 
(assuming they have any expectations), nor to demand that the expectations 
of the two groups match. But then according to our objector in such cases 
we cannot speak of epistemic public trust at all – which is counter-intuitive.  
Finally, if we accept our objector’s reasoning, then epistemic public trust in 
science becomes impossible when the public’s and scientists’ value 
judgements about the distribution of inductive risks diverge. We provide a 
case study of such divergence in section 5. More worrisome for our 
objector’s position are cases where the public, unlike the scientific 
community, has a biased or erroneous assessment of the inductive risks, 
because, for instance, they disregard certain populations or long-term 
consequences. In such cases, our objector would have to say that scientists 
are untrustworthy.11 We can make much better sense of such cases by saying 
that while there is basic epistemic trust there is not enhanced epistemic trust 
between scientists and the public. 
Enhanced epistemic trust makes a much more direct kind of reliance on 
scientists possible for the public. It also provides the public with an added 
level of assurance. When conditions 5 and 6 are satisfied, the public knows 
that scientists have taken measures to avoid the kind of possible errors that 
the public would like to avoid. Indeed, in applied research in such fields as 
medicine, pharmacology, genetic engineering and toxicology that could 
bring both immense benefits and catastrophic harm to people, it may be 
desirable that scientists take into account people’s expectations about the 
distribution of inductive risks when making methodological decisions.12 We 
can assume that scientists can do that without sacrificing scientific rigour. 
Condition 6, however, places a heavy burden on the shoulders of ordinary 
citizens. How can they discharge it? As with condition 4, they are typically 
                                                        
11We thank Martin Carrier for this point. 
12Note that we do not take a position on whether scientists should always take the public's 
evaluation of inductive risks into account. Our claim is conditional: If scientists have taken 
the public's evaluation into account and the public has good reasons to believe that this is 
the case, then the public can have warranted enhanced epistemic trust in scientists.  
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in no position to have first-order reasons as to whether Condition 5 is 
satisfied or not for any research finding. Perhaps then they can appeal to 
second-order reasons discussed in section 3? Unfortunately, those reasons 
typically function as a proxy for whether a given piece of research is reliable 
or not, not for whether its inductive risks are distributed in a way to meet 
public’s expectations. However, we believe there are two mechanisms that 
can introduce the public’s views on inductive risks to scientific research. 
Their existence can give the public reasons to believe that Condition 5 is 
satisfied.  
Hybrid forums: Consider hybrid forums (in the form of consensus 
conferences, citizens’ juries and panels practiced in many countries), where a 
group of scientists and a small number of ordinary citizens, representative of 
all segments of their society, come together for a few days or even weeks to 
deliberate upon a specific scientific issue that concerns the public.13 During 
these meetings the citizens raise whatever questions and concerns they have, 
and the scientists respond to them.14 It is at this stage, we suggest, the 
citizens can also inquire about whether there are any serious inductive risks 
involved for their welfare and if so what they are, share their expectations 
about them and explore whether they match the value judgements of 
scientists. If the deliberative process results in an agreement between their 
respective value judgements, this will no doubt enhance the representative 
citizens’ trust in the scientists. Provided the media does a good job of 
disseminating the conclusions reached to the rest of the citizens, then the 
public too will have increased enhanced trust in scientists.  
Diversity: Feminist philosophers of science have long argued that the 
diversity of deeply held values and diversity with respect to gender, ethnicity 
and class of researchers contribute to scientific objectivity by eliminating or 
limiting their prejudices (see, for example, Keller [1985] and Longino 
[1990]). To the extent individuals’ prejudices bias scientific conclusions, 
such diversity can be said to enhance the reliability of research. It seems to 
us that diversity in the intended sense can also serve as a kind of second-
order reason we are looking for in Condition 6. That is, it can be argued 
that the more diverse the group of scientists, the more likely it is that their 
research will reflect the public’s expectations regarding the distribution of 
inductive risks rather than just a segment of the public. However, it should 
                                                        
13 For an overview of hybrid forums see Bucchi ([2009]). For their role in risk assessment 
see Douglas ([2009], ch. 8).  
14Note that enhanced trust builds upon basic trust, which we assume to be in place in this 
discussion.  
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be acknowledged that even if the scientific community is sufficiently diverse, 
their values might differ from the public’s due to their public responsibilities 
and their scientific training which inculcates in them a specific set of values 
(Douglas [2009] pp. 172-173). 
Of these two mechanisms, clearly hybrid forums constitute a much more 
direct and powerful mechanism that enables citizens to introduce their 
expectations and to see if the inductive risks are distributed to meet them. 
At any rate, both mechanisms, even though not entirely sufficient, can 
inform members of the public whether they ought to invest enhanced trust. 
Finally, it should be noted that high levels of enhanced epistemic trust will 
be difficult to maintain if there is a lot of variation among the members of 
the public regarding their evaluations of inductive risks.  
 
5 A Case Study: The Alleged Causal Link Between MMR Vaccination and 
Autism. 
The controversy over the alleged link between the measles-mumps-rubella 
(MMR) vaccine and autism as it unfolded in the UK provides a good case to 
illustrate our account. We present this controversy first from the scientific 
research perspective (section 5.1) and then look at it from the public's 
perspective (section 5.2). Specifically, we ask whether members of the public 
were in a position to decide in whom to place basic and enhanced epistemic 
trust in light of the information available to them. As the issue of enhanced 
epistemic trust is more complex, we take it up in section 5.3. 
5.1 A brief overview of the MMR controversy: the scientific perspective 
In 1998, Andrew Wakefield, a gastroenterologist at the Royal Free 
Hospital, and his co-authors published a study in The Lancet. The study, 
based on twelve patients who had been referred to the hospital, suggested 
that the MMR vaccine was a precipitating cause of a new syndrome of 
inflammatory bowel disease (enterocolitis) which in turn caused regressive 
autism (Wakefield et al. [1998]). 
In addition to being a case-series with just twelve patients, which is of 
limited evidential value, the study had various shortcomings that were 
pointed out in Chen and DeStefano's article that accompanied Wakefield et 
al.’s article (Chen and DeStefano [1998]). They noted that Wakefield did 
not report finding vaccine viruses in the bowel or brain tissues of the 
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patients involved in the study. They also noted two sources of bias. There 
could be selection bias in the study since it was known that the group was 
interested in the connection between inflammatory bowel disease and the 
MMR vaccine. The MMR vaccine was widely administered in the UK. 
Thus, just by chance there would be children with both autism and bowel 
problems who had been vaccinated even in the absence of a causal 
connection between them. Given that Wakefield was working in a specialist 
clinic where such cases would be referred to, they were likely to come across 
patients with this set of symptoms. Chen and DeStefano also pointed out 
that there could also be recall bias on the parts of parents, given the 
difficulty of precisely knowing when the symptoms of autism first appeared. 
Furthermore, they noted that the time when developmental abnormalities 
first emerge in children with autism is also the time when vaccines are 
administered. This, they suggested, could lead to false attributions of a 
causal link.  
Immediately following Wakefield’s claims, The Medical Research Council 
(MRC), the government agency in the UK responsible for funding and 
advancing medical research as well as informing the public about it, had set 
up an ad hoc committee which consisted of 37 experts from a variety of 
fields. The MRC concluded that there was ‘no evidence to indicate any link 
between MMR vaccination and bowel disease or autism’, and hence no 
reason to change the existing MMR vaccination policy (Bignall [1998], p. 
966). The MRC had also set up an expert subgroup to look further into the 
research on the link between autism and the MMR vaccine. That group had 
thirteen members, including virologists, epidemiologists, neuroscientists, 
and observers from the department of health. The subgroup also invited 
other specialists, including Wakefield, to particular meetings. The resulting 
report noted that ‘the case for ‘autistic enterocolitis’ had not been proven’ as 
the studies had been performed in a self-selected and atypical group of 
patients and that there were alternative explanations of the symptoms that 
Wakefield and his co-authors had identified that were not ruled out in their 
study (Fitzpatrick [2004], p. 105). 
In 2001 the MRC subgroup’s report was followed by a much more 
thorough MRC report that looked more broadly at the epidemiology and 
causes of autism. The report, which aimed to inform both health 
professionals and the general public, was made publicly available on the 
MRC's website. Since it aimed to address the public's worries as well as 
informing them, it incorporated ‘questions and other extensive input from 
lay people … from the outset’ (MRC [2001], p. 2). The report also 
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summarized several epidemiological studies from the UK, the US and 
Finland and concluded that ‘the current epidemiological evidence does not 
support the proposed link of MMR to ASDs [autism spectrum disorder]’ 
(MRC [2001], p. 31).  
Whereas the first two MRC reports had provided little information that 
laypeople could use in deciding whether to trust the scientists who had 
contributed to these reports, the 2001 report provided very detailed 
information. It included the criteria for membership in the review, steps 
taken to manage conflicts of interest, and the credentials of the members of 
the review as well possible sources of conflict (MRC [2001], pp. 68-76). 
In March 2004, 10 of the 12 co-authors of the infamous 1998 paper 
withdrew support from Wakefield's MMR-autism link claim. In February 
2010, The Lancet retracted the paper. In the end, Wakefield's integrity as a 
scientist was put into question. It was found that Wakefield manipulated 
the data obtained from his twelve patients and failed to disclose his multiple 
conflicts of interest to the editor of The Lancet. These included his 
involvement in a patent application of a new vaccine for measles which, he 
also claimed, would be a treatment for inflammatory bowel disease, as well 
as receiving substantial sums of money in Legal Aid funding to investigate a 
possible link between the MMR vaccine and autism to support a class action 
suit against vaccine manufacturers. As a result, in 2010, a General Medical 
Council inquiry found Wakefield guilty of ‘serious professional misconduct’ 
for having failed to disclose conflicts of interest, acting contrary to the 
clinical interests of his patients, and misrepresenting facts relevant to his 
study (GMC [2010]; see also Deere [2011]). Consequently, Wakefield was 
struck off the medical register, and his 1998 paper was retracted from The 
Lancet. 
In short, already by the end of 2001 the consensus of the relevant medical 
community was that there was no evidence of causal link between MMR 
vaccine and autism. By the end of 2010, nothing was left of the alleged 
causal link, the article that made the claim, and the credibility of its main 
author. 
5.2 The public's perspective 
Phase 1: Wakefield’s public relations strategy – Wakefield had employed a 
public relations firm (Speers and Lewis [2004], p. 179) – and press coverage 
played a crucial role in how the controversy over the MMR vaccine 
unfolded in the UK. The publication of Wakefield’s Lancet paper was 
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publicized at a press conference in 1998, during which he suggested several 
times that three single vaccines would be safer than the MMR vaccination 
in combination – a claim not made in the paper, and rejected by some of his 
co-authors at the meeting (Boyce [2007], pp. 4-5). The paper and the press 
conference received limited attention in the media. Thus, the question for 
our purposes is this: were ordinary people who had been exposed to the 
news at the time in a position to assess Wakefield’s claims? Even though 
there were first-order reasons to be sceptical of them, it would be too much 
of a wrench to expect from ordinary citizens to engage with them. More 
realistically, they were in a position to appeal to second-order reasons, which 
pointed in the direction of trusting him. He was a doctor in a major 
teaching hospital. His article was published in The Lancet, one of the most 
respected medical journals. Although he was a gastroenterologist and not an 
expert on autism, this was not cause for suspicion given the causal 
hypothesis he had put forward.  
Phase 2: Four years later, in February 2002, the BBC’s Panorama, a popular 
current affairs documentary program, broadcast an episode on Wakefield’s 
claims following the publication of a paper co-written by him that aimed to 
further support his initial findings.15 In the same month, there were measles 
outbreaks in London and North England. These two events brought 
Wakefield’s claims on the public agenda (Speers and Lewis [2004]). In the 
period between 1 February and 15 September 2002, there were a total of 
285 stories on the link between MMR and autism in the major news outlets 
in Britain (Boyce [2007], p. 15). Unfortunately, the press did a poor job of 
informing the public. The convention of seeking to ensure bias-free 
reporting merely by presenting both sides of a story irrespective of their 
merits resulted in coverage that gave significant voice to Wakefield's claims. 
About half the stories in the press gave equal coverage to Wakefield's claims 
and the consensus in the scientific community against them. Moreover, 32% 
of the stories in the press contained only information that was against the 
MMR vaccine. As a result, the press coverage gave the misleading 
impression that there was equal support for and against Wakefield's claims 
(Boyce [2007], pp. 71-94). 
                                                        
15The study published in the journal Molecular Pathology claimed to identify the measles 
virus in the intestinal tissues of patients with inflammatory bowel syndrome and autism 
(Uhlman et al. [2002]). However, the study did not establish that the virus was due to the 
MMR vaccine, and other doubts were raised against the accuracy of its results. Moreover, 
one of the authors publicly stated that the study was not intended to investigate the role of 
the MMR vaccine even though that was how Wakefield used the results. For a discussion 
see (Fitzpatrick [2004], pp. 107-8).  
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What and whom to believe regarding the relationship between the MMR 
vaccine and autism at the height of the media controversy in early 2000’s 
was for many parents an important question. Were they in a position to 
make an informed decision?  The answer is an unequivocal ‘yes, with some 
effort’. For, as we saw in the previous subsection, before the media hype 
throughout the year 2002, several reports by the British Medical Research 
Council, one of which specifically targeted the public, were available to 
them. By presenting the credentials and the institutional affiliations of the 
committee members, the MRC ([2001]) report provided laypeople with the 
information they needed for deciding whom to trust. By taking steps to 
identify and manage conflicts of interest and sharing them with the public, 
the report assured the public of the integrity of the committee. The report 
also did a good job of educating the public and placing them in a position to 
form an opinion about the first-order evidence bearing on the question by 
outlining the weight of different kinds of evidence, what would be needed 
to establish a causal link and presenting the existing evidence. Therefore, 
even at the height of the controversy – before Wakefield’s misconduct was 
revealed and his article retracted – laypeople were in position to place trust 
on the scientists who maintained that there was no evidence for a 
connection between the MMR vaccine and autism. 
Phase 3: When Wakefield was struck off the medical register and The 
Lancet retracted his article, it made national news (see, for example, The 
Guardian, 10 May 2010; see also BBC News 10 May 2010). At that point, 
ordinary citizens had every possible reason at their disposal not to trust 
Wakefield and not to believe that MMR vaccine causes autism. 
5.3 Enhanced epistemic trust in the MMR controversy 
The questions raised by enhanced trust are much more complex. The 
possibilities over which the public’s and the scientists’ judgements of 
inductive risks are defined are presented in the table below where H is the 
hypothesis ‘There is no causal link between the MMR vaccine and autism’16: 
 Accept H & H is true Accept H & H is false 
Reject H & H is true Reject H & H is false 
 
                                                        
16We are excluding the possibility of suspending judgement for the sake of simplicity and 
for the reason that the parents have to choose between vaccinating and not vaccinating their 
children. 
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We do not have data to determine how parents and scientists informing the 
public health officials in the UK ranked these various outcomes. However, a 
reasonable guess can be made about their respective attitudes towards the 
possibility of two kinds of error, that is, the bottom left and the top right 
cells. We believe we can safely assume that scientists’ primary concern is 
public health, whereas parents are primarily concerned with the health of 
their children. This, we conjecture, can lead to divergences between their 
respective inductive risk judgements. Arguably, the consequences of 
rejecting H when H is in fact true are much graver from the perspective of 
scientists than they are from the perspective of parents. First, scientists have 
to consider not only the harms of mumps, measles, and rubella, but also the 
costs of allocating resources to treating the increased incidence of these 
diseases – resources that could otherwise be used to treat other diseases. 
This is a consideration that does not figure in parents’ judgements of risk. 
The second reason why parents and scientists may judge inductive risks 
differently is related to the phenomenon of herd immunity. When a certain 
rate of vaccination is reached within a population, this contains the risk of 
contagion, thereby affording protection to those who are not vaccinated. 
The fact that one may enjoy protection from a disease even when not 
vaccinated, provided a sufficient number of others are vaccinated, results in 
risks appearing differently to individual parents and scientists.17 If scientists 
falsely reject H and announce it to the public, which then leads to a decline 
in the vaccination rate, they put the whole population at risk of MMR. If, 
however, a parent falsely rejects H and acts on this false belief, the risk for 
their child is relatively small, provided the vaccination rate within the 
population is high enough and herd immunity obtains. If, on the other 
hand, they accept H when H is in fact false and vaccinate their child, they 
put their child at risk of autism. Accordingly, the risk involved in falsely 
rejecting H is much graver for scientists, who have public responsibilities, 
than it is for parents. 
The considerations we have presented that bear on inductive risk are not 
conclusive and would need to be corroborated with empirical evidence. 
Nevertheless, they point to two tentative conclusions. First, parents were in 
a position to deliberate about whether conditions for enhanced trust were 
satisfied in the MMR vaccine controversy since the facts we relied on in our 
discussion were publicly known. Second, it would not be unreasonable for 
                                                        
17 Stephen John ([2011]) also notes how this fact may have shaped the public’s thinking 
about inductive risk.   
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them to withhold enhanced epistemic trust since scientists had reasons to be 
more concerned with falsely rejecting H than parents.  
Our discussion suggests that enhanced trust may be difficult to achieve 
when collective and individual interests are not aligned. Moreover, the lack 
of enhanced trust between the members of the public and scientists can arise 
even when people are well informed and scientists have carried out reliable 
research. In other words, enhanced trust may be lacking even though neither 
party is at fault when the parties are guided by different values. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Our analysis reveals that different actors and institutions, who carry out 
different tasks and engage in different processes, are involved in the building 
of warranted epistemic public trust in science. These include scientists who 
are responsible for the production of reliable research and its honest 
communication. The accurate dissemination of their research to the public 
is primarily the responsibility of the media, though scientific bodies and 
journals play an important role in this context as well. Finally, members of 
the public too must shoulder some responsibility if the epistemic trust they 
invest in science is to be warranted; that is, they must have good (typically, 
second-order) reasons for believing that the research results that have been 
disseminated to them are reliable and that their expectations about the 
inductive risks involved are satisfactorily met. Let us call this last process 
‘the process of evaluation’. 
Building warranted public epistemic trust in science, then, depends on 
various institutions’ and actors’ carrying out their tasks of production, 
dissemination, and evaluation properly. What are the societal conditions 
that need to be satisfied to this end? Answering this question requires a 
study of its own, but we can highlight some of those conditions suggested 
by our analysis and case study. 
Reliability of research findings depends not only on the right employment 
of appropriate scientific methodology, but also on adherence to the ethical 
values and norms of science, as seen in the MMR-autism controversy – 
most notably in this case, intellectual honesty and avoidance of financial 
conflicts of interest. No doubt, violating ethical norms of research – whether 
they take the form of fabricating data, misrepresenting facts, failing to avoid 
conflicts of interest or loss of objectivity due to ‘funding bias’ – can seriously 
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undermine the reliability of research. Ultimately, then, reliability of research 
is a matter of both the proper internal organization of cognitive labour of 
scientific community (see Kitcher [1993], especially chs. 3 and 8) and the 
proper social organization of science that includes having the right incentive 
structure as well as ethical committees that oversees research so that it is not 
vulnerable to various distorting effects, especially those of financial 
interests.18 
Turning to the process of dissemination of scientific information, the media 
is clearly the most important source for ordinary citizens. For that reason 
high-quality science journalism emancipated from the profit-maximizing 
pressures of sensational reporting is a sine-qua-non for public’s having 
access to accurate news about science. Scientific journals too can contribute 
to the dissemination of scientific findings in a way that is understandable by 
the public by including lay abstracts – a practice that has been adopted by 
some medical journals and that should be encouraged in other fields as well. 
Scientific academies and governmental agencies (like the Medical Research 
Council in the UK, Surgeon General and the Food and Drug 
Administration in the USA) also play a crucial role in disseminating 
scientific information vital for the public. Perhaps the most important 
institutional precondition for them in view of public trust is their relative 
autonomy to protect them from the pressures of governments and 
corporations that could cause biased results. 
As for the process of evaluation, obviously people must have the necessary 
knowledge and skills in order to be able to appeal to the right kind of 
reasons to form a good opinion about the reliability of research findings 
disseminated to them. This is of course only possible with a wide and 
properly functioning basic education system that encompasses all segments 
of a society. An education that equips people with basic scientific literacy, 
develops their critical thinking skills and gives them an understanding of 
how science works in terms of both its methods and social organization 
(e.g., its system of peer review, its ethical values and norms, etc.) is essential 
for enabling the public to make judgements regarding whom to trust.  
                                                        
18In fact, people respond to concerns about the incentives scientists face and take them 
into account when deciding whom to trust. Empirical research suggests that public trust in 
scientists declines considerably if people think that scientists suffer from financial conflicts 
of interests or loss of independence. See, for example, European Commission ([2010], p. 
19) Critchley ([2008]), and Hargreaves et al. ([2003], p. 29). 
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If enhanced trust is to be realized over and above basic trust, there should be 
further social mechanisms in place that opens up science to input from the 
public regarding the distribution of inductive risks. Hybrid forums properly 
organized, we suggested, constitute one such mechanism, which has the 
extra advantage of enabling people to have an informed opinion about the 
reliability of research under discussion. Thus, establishing them and 
encouraging ordinary people to participate in them can contribute to the 
building of enhanced trust. Promoting diversity of research groups and 
communities in terms of gender, ethnicity, and even nationality in some 
cases such as global warming, can be another way of achieving the same. 
Both require significant changes in the social organization of science and in 
science policy. 
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